A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower (94 page)

40
McCullough 71, p18.

41
Butler 78, p91.

42
See Hori 83, on which much of the following account draws.

43
In terms of cavalry tactics, the Japanese had little or no experience, as their mounted warriors generally fought singly, not in groups. The matter of weaponry raises one of the most intriguing yet ignored questions in Japanese history. Contemporary scroll-paintings indicate unmistakably that the Mongols had cannon, albeit primitive. Marine archaeology has also established that they had explosive grenades launched by catapult. However, I have been unable to find any explanation of why the Japanese did not attempt to produce their own versions. Most histories simply state that gunpowder-based weapons were first brought to Japan by the Portuguese in the mid-sixteenth century. Given that the Japanese of that later time immediately developed their own firearms in an early display of the adaptive skills for which they are widely recognised, and given the importance of preparing better for any subsequent Mongol attacks, it is mystifying that no attempt appears to have been made to adapt, or even simply imitate, Mongol firearms. Even if the Mongol gunpowder-based weapons were ‘lost at sea’, the sea there is relatively shallow, and divers – especially the famed
ama
divers – could easily have salvaged them, including cannons by fixing ropes to haul them up.

44
The prime figure in the research and discovery has been the marine archaeologist Hayashida Kenz
. See the video
Khublai Khan: Fall of the Mongol Hordes
, 2005, by Atlantic Productions for the Discovery Channel.

45
Shinoda 83, p171.

46
Collcutt 93, p60.

47
Varley 83, p192.

48
See Kat
81, p301, who comes to the same conclusion.

49
The degree of actual loyalty depended to a considerable extent on the status of the samurai and their relationship to their lord, such as whether they were hereditary retainers or not. Moreover, the Japanese term typically translated as ‘loyalty’,
ch
setsu
, seems in actual fact during the period in question to have had more a sense of professional service than any idea of unconditional obedience. See Conlan 97, pp40–1.

50
The following draws on McCullough 59, p.xx.

51
See Massarella 90, p32.

52
Massarella 90, p32.

53
Gay 85, p58.

54
From the translation in Keene 68, p299.

55
For more details see Massarella 90, pp23–4, Elisonas 91, p302, and Cortazzi 90, p130.

56
Cooper 65, p.ix.

57
See Cortazzi 90, p121, who also gives a number of other analogies.

58
For example, at Nagashima in 1574. See Elison 83a, p63.

59
In his destruction in 1571 of the Tendai Sect’s Enryakuji Temple on Mount Hiei (in Ky
to), as many as 10,000 people were encircled and systematically massacred, including not only priests but women and children. See Mason and Caiger 72, p143. Contemporary accounts are found in Tsunoda 64, v.1, pp305–8, and (by a European) in Cooper 65, pp98–9. There were also many casualties in his capture in 1580 of the J
do Shin Sect’s castle stronghold at Ishiyama Honganji in Osaka.

60
Cooper 65, pp101–2.

61
Elison 83a, p64. Nobunaga did briefly accept high offices from the court in 1577 but resigned from them after only a few months.

62
Nobunaga had bought 500 matchlocks for his troops while still a teenage commander in 1549, just six years after their introduction by the Portuguese. However, despite refinements by Japanese craftsmen, their effective use in battle was for some years impeded by such problems as the delay in loading and firing. A number of other
daimy
, such as Tanegashima Tokitaka (1528–79) and Katsuyori’s father Takeda Shingen (1521–73), were similarly enthusiastic about firearms, but Nobunaga seems to have been the most effective user. The battle is depicted, though with some dramatic licence, in Akira Kurosawa’s famous film
Kagemusha
. For a detailed account of the battle, see Turnbull 87, pp79–94.

The mystery still remains why the Japanese did not attempt to produce firearms three centuries earlier, when they saw primitive versions being used by the Mongols.

63
A contemporary account of this incident is given in Cooper 65, p103.

64
‘Sword Hunt’ was a misleading term, since all types of weapons were confiscated. A surprising number of firearms were found. The edict is given in Tsunoda 64, v.1, pp319–20.

65
The edict is given in Tsunoda 64, v.1, pp321–2.

66
The captain of the Spanish ship San Felipe, which was wrecked on the Shikoku coast late in 1596, had apparently spread a rumour suggesting they were an advance guard, but Hideyoshi’s actions still seem extreme. See Massarella 90, pp45–6.

67
Cooper 65, pp111–13.

68
From 1590, at Hideyoshi’s instigation, the size of fiefs was measured in
koku
, a yield of rice equivalent to 182 litres or just over 5 bushels, which was supposed to represent the requirements of one person for one year.

Part Three: The Closed Country

1
A translation is given in Tsunoda 64, v.1, pp326–9.

2
See Hearn 1904, p193.

3
Sat
90, p41. See also Hanley and Yamamura 77, pp89–90. The Keian Proclamation of 1649, issued under Ieyasu’s grandson Iemitsu (Sh
gun 1623–51), is a good example of such prescriptions.