Read A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower Online
Authors: Kenneth Henshall
The complex writings of the widely acclaimed novelist Murakami Haruki are felt to reflect the anxieties of the Japanese around this time. For example, in his 1997 novel
Underground
(English translation 2000), he remarks how the AUM group was able to attract members by offering a world-view that spared them ‘the anxiety of confronting each new situation on their own’, and he wonders about the extent to which Japanese society could offer these individuals ‘a more viable narrative’.
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This is certainly an indication that Murakami believed the public were feeling directionless, particularly with regard to a lack of a sense of belonging and togetherness.
These events of 1995 brought out what some see as a latent sense of vulnerability in the Japanese – and not just in terms of Japan’s geographical location on the ‘Ring of Fire’. Broadly speaking, scholars have noted that continued weakening of Japan’s economic, political, and socio-cultural bases has, in combination with weakening family ties and weakening moral guidelines, led to a degree of loss of meaning and stability, with concomitant anxiety and disorientation, and a fragmentation of the self exacerbated by commercialism and consumerism.
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To some extent it could be said that this has been a worldwide phenomenon in a post-structuralist, (post-)postmodern age that has seen the dismantling of many ‘grand narratives’ and hitherto established world-views and perceptions of the self. However, in terms of degree, Japan seems once again to be towards the serious end of the spectrum.
Regardless of their actual accuracy or inaccuracy, these narratives and world-views have provided a sense of order and communion for many people around the world – sometimes devised by the authorities for propaganda purposes, and sometimes stemming from commonalities among the public themselves. Even when demonstrably inaccurate, they can still retain a strong grip on the public. In perceptions of England’s history, for example, the nation’s defeat in the Battle of Hastings in 1066 has over-whelmingly been seen by the English public as sheer bad luck on King Harold’s part, earning him considerable sympathy, when in fact it can be demonstrated that the defeat was due largely to his own disastrous decision-making, thus changing him from fabled hero to real-life villain. But ‘Harold the Hero’ still prevails. Exactly the same is true of Boudica too.
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In Japan’s case, one classic example is the mistaken belief that all samurai fought honourably and to the death, a belief that still strongly survives today among the Japanese public. More recent Japanese examples are that postwar Japan was invincible in the economic arena, and – as seen in the domestic popularity of
Nihonjinron
– that almost everything about Japan is unique and special.
Stating the obvious, people are generally uncomfortable when their beliefs are challenged, and especially so when proved to be inescapably wrong. By the mid 1990s, Japan’s economic invincibility was now blatantly and undeniably disproven, and relentless criticism, mainly but not entirely from the west, had also by this stage largely (though not entirely) dispelled the myth of Japanese uniqueness and ‘specialness’. In an attempt to find something else to restore national pride, in 1996 a group of revisionist Japanese historians decided to create a new ‘grand narrative’ by putting a more nationalistically positive spin on Japan’s history,
producing a new and supposedly more accurate school text.
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The group is known as the ‘Tsukuru Kai’, an abbreviation of ‘Atarashii Rekishi-Ky
kasho o Tsukuru Kai’ (Society for the Production of a New History Textbook).
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Its key figures include noted professors such as Nishio Kanji, Fujioka Nobukatsu, and Hata Ikuko. Its aim has been to restore pride in Japan’s past by providing what the group saw as a more accurate account of history, particularly with regard to the twentieth century and the Pacific War and the lead-up to it, as opposed to victors’ accounts. As any historian with both eyes open would agree, there is certainly some validity in questioning accounts written by victors in any time or place, in similar fashion to the argument that there was victor’s justice in the case of the T
ky
War Crimes Trial. However, it must in turn be questioned as to how many eyes the Tsukuru Kai have kept open, and it would seem to be just one. They believe that Japan has allowed itself to be too much criticised and should stop concerning itself with apologies and compensation claims. They also view Hirohito very favourably.
Amidst much controversy the textbook was duly written and eventually vetted by the Ministry of Education, but very few schools have adopted it since its release in 2001 – though it was a best-seller among the general public. It has been widely criticised, among other things, for justifying Japan’s occupation of Korea, blaming China for provoking Japan, stressing a Japanese aim of liberating Asia from western oppression, and playing down Japanese atrocities.
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The Japan Teachers’ Union has denounced it, and after re-authorisation of the text in 2005, protests were staged in China and Korea. It has certainly not helped Japan’s relations with mainland Asian nations.
In response to criticism, the Tsukuru Kai adroitly and ironically used the very same postmodern dismantling of grand narratives to support their approach. One of the main consequences worldwide of the demolition of narratives has been a growing recognition by many people that there is relatively little absolute objective truth in life. This obviously includes history, which is often seen as a construct serving the interests of state power. Thus the Tsukuru Kai and its supporters have argued that history could – in the words of one supporter of the New History text – be used legitimately to serve to ‘nurture a healthy nationalism in our young people’. He went on to add that ‘the New History is like the Bible – a “story” meant to inspire you’.
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One of the members of Tsukuru Kai with particular influence over young people is the
manga
(cartoon) artist Kobayashi Yoshinori, who produced the
manga
book
Sens
ron
(On War) in 1998. The publication glorified Japan’s role in the Pacific War and proved to be very popular amongst the public. He had been alarmed by the 1995 AUM Shinriky
subway attack, interpreting it as indicative of an alienation of the Japanese from their own past, and of their current sense of emptiness. As a result he started to embrace ultranationalism, feeling that there was a need to reject ‘masochistic history’ and instead promote history that does not reflect brainwashing of the Japanese to revile their own past. His
Sens
ron
reminded Japanese that ‘Japan is a country of the gods’.
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Other voices too have seemed to feel a sense of loss of national identity, though not necessarily to the extreme of adopting an ultranationalistic stance to counteract it. The Nobel Prize winning writer
e Kenzabur
said in an interview in 2002 that ‘Our identity as Japanese has withered away. … In Japan the family has come apart, and our sense of community has also disappeared. … We are confused and lost. The response to that lostness is nationalism. …’
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