A Civil War (84 page)

35
‘Relazione dell'ispettore Dario sulla situazione nelle Marche, nella Toscana e nell'Emilia', June 1944 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, p. 58). See also the analogous case in the inspector Paolo's report, ‘Cari compagni', of 15 June 1944 (ibid., pp. 33–5).

36
‘Relazione sulla situazione delle Brigate d'Assalto Garibaldi dell'Oltrepò Pavese', signed by the commissar Piero, 3 September 1944. Piero comments that ‘this is a symptom of their weakness' and an attempt to buy time while awaiting reinforcements (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, p. 304). Indeed, this was during the period of the partisans' great summer offensive.

37
PCI report ‘Sulla situazione militare e politica dal 19 ottobre al 4 novembre', n.d. (INSMLI,
CLNAI
, envelope 8, folder 2, subfolder 9).

38
See the note to the letter of Aminta Pruneri, class of 1891 (
LRSI
, pp. 148–9).

39
See Artom,
Diari
, pp. 165, 167 (dated 10 and 13 February 1944).

40
The subtitle of the article, ‘Lo sciopero a Milano', covered the whole first page of the 20 December 1943 Lombard edition of
L'Italia Libera
.

41
See the
Informazioni per il CLN
2 (18 January 1944) (ISRT,
Carte Francesco Berti
, envelope 1, folder 3, subfolder
Informazioni
).

42
See
Atti CVL
, p. 559, and
Atti CLNAI
, pp. 206–8.

43
‘La lotta partigiana in Piemonte',
Avanti!
Rome edition, 12 January 1944.

44
‘Un Corpo d'Armata sulle retrovie della linea gotica',
L'Unità
northern edition, 7 August 1944.

45
See Deakin,
Storia della Repubblica di Salò
, Turin: Einaudi, 1963, p. 714. A secret circular of the RSI Regional Military Command, 11 September 1944, archived in the IVSR speaks of contacts between the Pasubio Division partisans and the Italian and German police, without ‘resulting in clarification'.

46
‘Una spina nel fianco',
L'Unità
northern edition, 7 September 1944 (on the liberated zones of the Emilian Appennines).

47
Bianco,
Guerra partigiana
, p. 99

48
The episode is recounted in the ‘Relazione di Marelli sul lavoro svolto fra i volontari della libertà in montagna' (Piacentino), 26 December 1944. Marelli argued that they would not keep their word (it was a matter of freeing an imprisoned German lieutenant in exchange for Ferrarini) (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. III, pp. 142–3).

49
Communication from the Ugo Muccini Garibaldi Brigade (La Spezia) to the local CLN leadership, 12 November 1944 (ISRT,
Carte Enzo Enriques Agnoletti
).

50
Such was the reasoning of
La Riscossa italiana
(organ of the Piedmont CLN) of January–February 1944, in its editorial ‘Saldezza del fronte antifascista', where it praised the freedom-fighters who had ‘almost unanimously' proved able to foil the enemy's manoeuvres.

51
See paragraph 20, ‘Direttive politiche' of the ‘Direttive per la lotta armata', Milan, February 1944. According to the document, ‘there is a national pact … and anti-communism must not become the cover for the struggle against it' (
Atti CVL
, p. 560).

52
The Piedmont delegation letter ‘Cari compagni', of 19 April 1944, referring in particular to an episode taking place in Val Sangone (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. I, pp. 355–9).

53
‘Circolare del Comando regionale lombardo alle formazioni dipendenti', 27 September 1944 (INSMLI,
CVL
, envelope 90, folder 1).

54
The circular is kept in IZDG, envelope 272b, folder 1/C.

55
The Cuneo No. 4 Brigade's political commissar P.'s letter ‘Cari compagni', 28 February 1944. The matter was reported with disdain by the Command of the Brigade to the Piedmont CLN's Military Committee on 15 March (IG,
BG
, 04211).

56
‘Dal colloquio con un compagno del Comitato federale di Novara', 30 December 1944. Also in December, a report on the organisational and political situation in the province signed by ‘Valbruna' (Vittorio Flecchia) for the attention of the PCI secretariat, held that ‘the Socialists, at first “radical” to the point of wanting to exclude the bourgeois currents from the CLN, have now become nothing less than capitulationist faced with the Fascists'; as a consequence of these changing positions, ‘it has thus far not been possible to implement the pact for unity in action' (‘Rapporto sulla situazione politica organizzativa', IG,
Archivio PCI
).

57
‘Relazione sull'attività militare', sent on 26 August 1944 to the Regional Command of the Command of the 4
^th
Piedmont Division (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, pp. 272–3).

58
Report from the inspector Riccardo (Alfredo Mordini) of the 3
^rd
Lombard Division ‘Aliotta', 25 November 1944. On 28 November he would inform the General Command's military delegation that the GL had made an agreement on its own, and thus the Garibaldians had been forced to bear the German assault alone (IG,
BG
01652 and 01654).

59
‘Situazione militare della zona sotto il controllo del Comitato militare di …', n.d., around mid-April 1944 (IG,
BG
03974).

60
Command of the 54
^th
Valcamonica Brigade to the Command delegation, ‘Notiziario-Bergamo', n.d. (IG,
BG
010564 and 010734).

61
The ‘Delegation for Lombardy' to the 1
^st
and 2
^nd
Divisions Group Command, 24 September 1944 (INSMLI,
CVL
, envelope 93, folder 4, subfolder a).

62
For example, the cases of Nevio in the Valle di Gressoney and of Gastone (86
^th
Brigade) in Valtellina. See the ‘Relazione sulla Valle di Gressoney. Rapporto del commissario della Valle, Negri' of 11 November 1944; the ‘Breve relazione riassuntiva per i compagni della Delegazione per la Lombardia', signed by Maiocchi, 2 December 1944; the communication from the Lombard Divisions Group Command to the Command delegation, 4 December 1944 (IG,
BG
, 05694: see
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, p. 585, note 3, and vol. III, pp. 13–17; IG,
BG
, 01287); as well as the very harsh reprimand, calling for revenge, from the delegation to Group Command (INSMLI,
CVL
, folder 4, subfolder a).

63
‘The comrades responsible' to the Vice-Commander Pietro and the ‘Comrades responsible for the 2
^nd
Piedmont Division', 16 December 1944 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. III, p. 101).

64
See the ‘Comunicato del Comando della 3
^a
divisione Piemonte', 2 October 1944 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. III, p. 393).

65
IG,
BG
, 01152.

66
Report dated 1 March 1945 and letter from the Lombard Command of the GL formations to the Command of the GL Division Orobica, 15 December 1944 (INSMLI,
CVL
, envelope 93, folder 5, subfolder a).

67
Regional GL Command for Lombardy to the Commissar Mario, 11 April 1945 (INSMLI,
CVL
, envelope 93, folder 5, subfolder a).

68
The suspicion that the Fiamme Verdi were prone to deals and bargaining with the enemy is illustrated by the ‘Relazione riservata del rappresentante delle formazioni gl nel Comando militare regionale lombardo sulla situazione politico-militare delle formazioni Fiamme Verdi e del generale Fiore', 18 March 1945 (INSMLI, old classification, Comando militare regionale lombardo, Delegazione Brigate GL, Corrispondenza). Similar reports appear in various Garibaldian documents: for example, a report from the inspector Remo to the Lombard Regional Command, the CLNAI and the Lombard delegation of 10 March 1944 (INSMLI,
CVL
, envelope 90, folder 4). For the arguments over the Fiamme Verdi and General Fiore, see the letter from the Bergamo zone-commander ‘Bassi' (Mario Buttaro) to the Lombard Regional Command, n.d. but January 1945 (IG,
BG
, 010605). The formation's commander, Captain Gianni, soon repented, asking to be readmitted into the movement (see letter from ‘Bassi' to the Lombard Regional Command, 20 March 1945, IG,
Archivio PCI
).

69
‘Circolare a tutti i commissari politici di brigata sui colloqui con i Comandi nemici', from the Command of the 1
^st
Gramsci Division, 20 October 1944 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, pp. 457–9).

70
See, for example, the ‘Circolare n. 19 sulle relazioni col nemico', from the Piave Zone Command, 20 March 1945 (ibid., vol. III, p. 511).

71
‘Informazioni da Torino', 13 December 1944, from the Piedmont insurrectionary triumvirate official Alfredo, who had sufficient scruple to say that this news was still yet not confirmed (ibid., p. 68). An apparently analogous case of GL members – or supposed GL members – fraternising with fascists was mentioned, and denounced, in a 3 April 1945 document sent from the Lombard Divisions Group Command to the delegation and insurrectionary triumvirate for Lombardy (ibid., pp. 574–8). The tendency not to trouble the Germans without having first been attacked was mentioned in a document of the Military Command of the Valli di Lanzo, 30 January 1944 (IG,
BG
, 04205).

72
See Lazagna,
Ponte rotto
, pp. 94, 167; on p. 172 there is a fine description of the population's many efforts assisting the partisans.

73
See Dellavalle,
Operai
, p. 119. On the coexistence of RSI and CLN authorities in peripheral areas, see pp. 210–11.

74
Bernardo,
Il momento buono
, p. 50.

75
See the observation made on this score in Chiovini and Mignemi,
Il 44 sulle sponde del Lago Maggiore
, p. 9.

76
‘Relazione sull'attività partigiana nella zona di Macerata', n.d. but late March 1944, probably written by the Communist federation (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. I, p. 343).

77
Bruzzone and Farina,
La Resistenza taciuta
, p. 23.

78
Bernardo,
Il momento buono
, p. 38.

79
See the ‘Relazione riguardante la zona dei Castelli Romani dal 22 gennaio 1944, data dello sbarco in Nettunia, al 15 febbraio 1944', n.d., unsigned (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. 1, pp. 261–2).

80
See Manno,
Le bande SIMAR
, pp 47–50.

81
See the letter sent from the Command of the 2
^nd
Piedmont Division to the Valli di Lanzo CLN, 22 July 1944 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, pp. 155–7).

82
See ‘Relazione dell'ispettore Gigi sulla ispezione al Comando del raggruppamento divisioni biellesi', 15 December 1944 (ibid, vol. III, p. 78).

83
See the sharp denunciation in the ‘Relazione sul lavoro svolto in Valle Maria', unsigned, 30 July 1944 (ibid., vol. II, pp. 172–4) and the warning sent to the Garibaldini of Dronero and the surrounding area by the commander, Steve, and the political commissar, Copeco, of the 104
^th
Carlo Fissore Brigade, 15 January 1945 (‘Ai garibaldini di Dronero e dintorni', ibid., vol. III, p. 238).

84
Report from Andrea ‘Dal Comando battaglione partigiani Friuli' (ibid., vol. I, pp. 95–7).

85
See Gorrieri,
La Repubblica di Montefiorino
, pp. 545–9; see also p. 561, n. 22. The words ‘civil war' (p. 547) are, in Gorrieri, an obvious slip of the pen, given that he denies the legitimacy of such an expression (see p. 222, n. 17).

86
See the ‘Promemoria per il CLN della Liguria d'incarico del presidente del CLN di Apuania', 28 December 1944. On 7 January 1945, the Apuania CLN president, Christian Democrat Enzo, drafted a ‘Relazione di massima sul movimento patriottico nella provincia di Apuania, per il CLNAI', which contained a section entitled ‘The truce with the Germans'. The truce entailed the mutual recognition of ‘zones of influence': the partisans could even circulate in the German zone, ‘if disarmed and not in uniform'; the Germans could enter the free zone ‘only in small platoons, out of urgent necessity and, if possible, with prior notice' (INSMLI,
CLNAI
, envelope 7, folder 3). See also ‘Relazione sulla insurrezione armata e conseguente liberazione delle città di Massa e Carrara', sent from the local PCI federation to the party leadership in Rome on 24 April 1945, which speaks of the ‘farce' of the German platoons and partisans passing through the city without troubling one another (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. III, pp. 687–92).

87
See the ‘Rapporto d'informazioni' from the Modena PCI federation, October 1944. The CLN did not accept this demand, but all the same posed very tough conditions of its own (ISRR,
Archivio triumvirato insurrezionale Emilia-Romagna
).

88
ISRT,
Carte Francesco Berti
, envelope 1, folder 1, Verbali del CTLN, 19, 23, 24, 26 and 27 June meetings. On this whole affair, see Francovich,
La Resistenza a Firenze
, pp. 233–6, according to which all negotiation was broken off on 26 June.

89
See the ‘Direttive n. 9' of 15 September 1944, probably drawn up by Secchia, and the ‘Direttive n. 16', drafted by Longo, of 10 April 1945 (
Le Brigate Garibaldi
, vol. II, pp 332–5; vol. III, pp. 591–5). Secchia, republishing some lines from the ‘Direttive n. 16', comments: ‘It is remarkable that serious historians have not brought out the full importance and proper value of these directives, which, in settling the matter once and for all, and ordering all Communists to act, if necessary, even by themselves – with full respect for the unity of all democratic forces and in the name of the CLN – were decisive for the success and ultimate triumph of the national insurrection' (
Il PCI e la guerra di liberazione
, p. 101).