1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (62 page)

The operational order for Operation Yoav called for "the routing [ migur] of the Egyptian army." The IDF deployed four brigades-Giv'ati, the Eighth, Yiftah, and the Negev-later joined by elements of the Ninth Brigade (Oded), as well as assorted supporting units, including three battalions of artillery and mortars. In the first stage, the IDF intended to drive wedges between the Egyptian forward positions along the south-north Rafah-Isdud and west-east Majdal-Beit fibrin axes, "open a corridor to the [besieged] Negev [enclave]," and capture Faluja and `Iraq al-Manshiya, midway between Majdal and Beit Jibrin; in stages "two" and "three," the IDF hoped to conquer Majdal and Gaza, respectively.3

The plan was a compromise between the General Staff's desire to destroy the core of the Egyptian expeditionary force through main assault and the more subtle approach of the newly appointed OC Southern Command, Yigal Allon, who preferred a staggered, indirect approach based on disrupting the Egyptian lines of communication and isolating the Egyptian brigades in pockets, the pockets then to be reduced ad seriatim.4 The Allon approach eventually prevailed. The originally envisaged frontal assaults on Gaza and Majdal were deferred, and the first stage of Operation Yoav, during 1S-zz October, resulted in the separation of the main western and eastern wings of the Egyptian army, the severing of the Majdal-Beit Jibrin line, and the encirclement of a brigade-size force at Faluja. Israeli forces also severed the Rafah-Isdud road, imperiling the brigade strung out between Gaza and Isdud. In the following days, the eastern wing of the Egyptian army, between Beersheba and Bethlehem, crumbled, most of the units retreating, without battle, to Sinai, and the brigade deployed on the road to Isdud retreated to Gaza, abandoning Isdud and Majdal to the Israelis.

In the weeks before the operation, the IDF infiltrated most of the refurbished Yiftah Brigade-the troops by foot and in nighttime convoys, one of them consisting of eighty vehicles (Egyptian troops noticed the convoy but reasoned that it was their own and failed to interfere),' and their heavy equipment mostly by airlift-into the besieged northern Negev enclave so that the Egyptians could be assaulted from both north and south of the Majdal-Beit Jibrin line. Many of the Negev Brigade's troops were airlifted in the aircraft returning northward, out of the enclave, for rest and reequipment.

On the eve of Yoav, the Egyptian expeditionary force consisted of the equivalent of four brigades, with nine regular infantry battalions, three artillery battalions, and two armored battalions, and assorted auxiliary formations, including Saudi and Sudanese battalions and companies, several Egyptian reserve infantry battalions, and hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood and Palestinian irregulars.6

The area from El Arish to Gaza was held by the Third Brigade, which included the Third Infantry Battalion; the road from Yad-Mordechai northward through Majdal to Hamama and the western section of the west-east wedge, from Majdal to `Iraq al-Manshiya, were held by the reinforced Fourth Brigade, which included the First, Second, Sixth, and Ninth battalions, a number of artillery battalions, and some Saudi, Sudanese, and local irregular companies; the coastal strip from Hamama northward to Isdud was held by the Second Brigade, which included the Fourth and Seventh infantry battalions and part of the Fifth Infantry Battalion; and the curving strip of territory stretching northeastward from Auja al-Hafir on the old NegevSinai frontier through Bir Asluj and Beersheba, to the Hebron Hills and Bethlehem, was held by the ragtag "Light Forces Command," which included the First (reserve) Infantry Battalion, part of the Fifth Infantry Battalion, and battalions of Muslim Brotherhood troops and other irregulars.?

The main Egyptian formations along the coast were supported by a battalion of sixteen light Mark VI tanks and a battalion of armored cars, including some Humber Ills. The infantry was also supported by a battalion of twentyfive-pounders (twenty-four guns), batteries of eighteen-pounders, and a number of 4.5-inch and 6-inch Howitzers. The force had four antiaircraft batteries (of 3.7-inch and 40 mm guns). The infantry battalions had sixpounder antitank guns. The "Light Forces Command" had the support of six 6-inch Howitzers and four six-pounder antitank guns but no armored cars or other tracked vehicles. The Egyptian force was severely lacking in ammunition, and some of what it had was of World War I vintage.`

Ben-Gurion defined the Cabinet decision of 6 October to attack the Egyptians as "the gravest [that is, most important] since we decided [on iz May] to establish the state."9 He understood that the offensive would unfold in the shadow of almost certain and speedy UN interference: "[The battles] won't continue for more than four-five days, as one can assume that the Security Council will immediately intervene. Seven days will be the maxinun." This meant that the IDF had to attack with great force and speed and achieve its objectives quickly.'()

The Egyptians seem to have sensed that an Israeli attack was imminent: in the days before Yoav they canceled all leave, and the front line units were ap parently placed on alert.'' Still, they were inadequately prepared for what hit them.

For political reasons, the Israeli plan called for the Egyptians to fire the first shots; Israel must not be branded the aggressor. As Ben-Gurion told the Cabinet: "A giant effort must be made [to show?] that the initiative and the responsibility come from the Arab side or at least that the whole question of the initiative and responsibility will be blurred."'2

Operation Yoav began on i5 October. During the previous weeks, the Egyptians had regularly blocked with fire the passage to the beleaguered northern Negev settlements of supply convoys, contrary to the truce terms. The IDF anticipated that they would continue to conform to pattern. A convoy was sent in from Karatiya, near Faluja, at around 3:0o PM. But "as the convoy covered every additional mile unmolested, our nerves were stretched to the breaking point," recalled Yitzhak Rabin, Allon's chief of operations. "The excuse for our attack was slipping out of our grasp." In the end, the Egyptians obliged with a few rounds. The Israelis responded and then New up one of their own fuel trucks to cause a commotion, and the Egyptians let loose and sent six Spitfires to attack Israeli positions at Dorot.1a "We had our pretext," Rabin recalled.14

The IAF-then consisting of eleven serviceable fighter aircraft (four Messerschmitts and seven Spitfires), three B-ids, and more than a dozen converted civilian aircraft's-went into action. In his order of the day, IAF commander Aharon Remez had written: "Let every soldier, every pilot and air crew member, every mechanic know ... that the fate of the corps, the people and state [depend on him]. Our soldiers at the fronts are looking skyward. We will not disappoint them."16 The assault by the whole of the IAF hit the main Egyptian airfield at El Arish and targets in Gaza and Majdal, the two Egyptian ground force HQs, at 6:oo PM. The aim was to catch the Egyptians on the ground and achieve air superiority, and to sow confusion in their command structure. At El Arish, the IAF achieved complete surprise and, together with continuous follow-up raids, rendered the airfield inoperative (the Israeli daily Davar, absurdly, compared the initial strike to "the blow launched by the Japanese against Pearl Harbor").'7 The raids on Gaza and Majdal were inaccurate and militarily ineffective. But the raiders hit the village of al-Jura, mistaking it for Majdal, with devastating effect; al-Jura served as a refugee way station. A follow-up raid on Majdal the following day was more effective. A captured Egyptian soldier described the raids: "In Majdal the IAF bombing hit an artillery communications position: four were killed, two were injured, and the signals truck was blown to bits. Terrible was the strike against the refugees living in al-Jura. He said that some 200-300 were killed and injured. In their second visit to Majdal [on 16 October] the aircraft hit 30-40 soldiers." 18

Operation Yoav and its aftermath, northern Negev, Majdal, 15 October-1o November 1948

One of the "bomb -chuckers"-usually air cadets-on board the Commando aircraft, Yoash Tzidon, later described the modus operandi: "[We] stood in a row in the cargo hold and rolled the bombs, whose detonators were neutralized by a pin, like a grenade, toward the open cargo door. The head of the team stood there, pulled out the pins, and then pushed out the ready bombs as quickly as possible.... We [eventually] reached a pace of [chucking out] a bomb per second. These were night missions and the targeting was done `approximately' by the pilot. Surprisingly, we occasionally hit the targets. We flew at 20,000 feet ... and we circled ... over the target area without oxygen sometimes for more than two hours.... The Egyptian AA fire was always strong." 9

Throughout Yoav, the IAF was to enjoy complete air supremacy. Though the two air forces were about even in the number of serviceable aircraft, the IAF had an overwhelming advantage in capable air- and ground crews. The IAF flew eight times as many missions as the Egyptians during Yoav. The Egyptians also suffered from a severe shortage in aerial munitions and spare parts.20 But in all, given the smallness of the air forces involved, air capabilities and operations had little effect on the fighting.

The IDF's ground effort began on the night of is-i6 October and was pressed relentlessly for seven days. That first night, Giv`ati's Fifty-third Battalion cut the Majdal-Beit Jibrin road by capturing hilltop Position 224.9 and Khirbet al-Masara, between `Iraq al-Manshiya and Qubeiba.21 Simultaneously, units of the Yiftah and Negev Brigades, advancing from Kibbutz Nir- Am, occupied a series of hilltop positions just east of Beit Hanun, from which IDF machine guns, mortars, and artillery henceforth dominated the Gaza-Majdal road. Repeated Egyptian counterattacks failed to dislodge the Israelis. Simultaneously, to keep the Egyptians guessing about the operation's strategic objectives, the Negev Brigade's Ninth Battalion mounted a series of (largely unsuccessful) raids to the southwest, harassing the Egyptians near Rafah, Khan Yunis, and the ruins ofKfar Darom.22

Allon's plan called not just for severing the Majdal-Beit Jibrin axis but also for chopping up the Egyptian forces deployed along it, isolating one unit from another. On 16 October, the IDF's Eighty-second and Seventh battalions failed to take the village of `Iraq al-Manshiya, roughly midway between Majdal and Beit Jibrin, suffering more than a hundred casualties. But that night, 16-17 October, Giv'ati drove a second wedge through the MajdalBeit Jibrin line, south of Negba. The Fifty-first Battalion in hard-fought battles took Egyptian positions "103," "113," and "ioo" and a fourth position overlooking the "Crossroads," effectively cutting the road between the `Iraq Suweidan police fort and Majdal. The Israelis attacked with determinationand "hatred" of the invader, according to the battalion's OC Yehuda Wallach.'-' One soldier, Ya'akov Arnon, wrote a letter to his parents just before the battle: "I was pampered at home, relatively spoiled. But you educated me to always to sacrifice on behalf of Zionism-and I am now off to fulfill the mission." He died later that day on Hill 113.24 Follow-up efforts on the nights of 17-18 and 18 -r9 October by Giv`ati to take the Huleikat positions and by Oded to cut the Egyptians' bypass road from `Iraq Suweidan to `Iraq al-Manshiya just south of Karatiya were beaten off.

By early r9 October it appeared that the IDF had been only partially successful. Ben-Gurion jotted down in his diary: "It is clear that we still don't have soldiers. Our boys are excellent, and they are good Zionists, but not yet soldiers."25 He even vented his doubts about Allon: "I fear that Yigal Allon is unable to command such a wide front."26

But this was to misread the significance of what had happened. True, several units had failed to uproot well-entrenched, tenacious Egyptian infantrymen and gunners. But the IDF had driven powerful wedges between the western (coastal) and eastern (Hebron Hills) arms of the Egyptian army, effectively isolating the eastern arm, and had driven a second wedge, between Gaza and Majdal. These successes had knocked the Egyptian high command off balance, preparing the ground for the following days' clinchers. Indeed, already on r9 October General al-Muwawi hastily withdrew his command post-which he saw as threatened with entrapment-from Majdal back to Gaza, using a dirt track west of Beit Hanun.

Al-Muwawi had acted just in time. That night, 19-20 October, Yiftah units expanded the western wedge, occupying Beit Hanun astride the Majdal-Gaza road;27 and a few miles to the east, Giv`ati's Fifty-second and Fiftyfourth battalions completed the conquest of the north-south road from Julis through the "Crossroads" to Huleikat, taking the Huleikat positions,28 forging continuity between the core Jewish state area to the north and the Negev enclave at Brur Hayil-Gvar- Am. At Huleikat, the Egyptians and their Saudi auxiliaries had fought bravely, the Givati troops suffering twentyeight dead and seventy wounded in seven hours of combat with bayonets and grenades.29 A simultaneous effort by Givati's Fifty-first Battalion to take the `Iraq Suweidan fort, immediately to the east, had failed. But the Egyptians strung out between Bethlehem and Hebron were now completely cut off from the western arm of the expeditionary force,30 and four thousand Egyptian troops were surrounded in an enclave, to be known as the "Faluja Pocket," along the Majdal-Beit Jibrin line, between `Iraq Suweidan and Khirbet al-Masara. They were to remain there, under siege, until late February 1949.