The Act of Creation (92 page)

IX-XI
), concerning the pitfalls of orthodoxy,
over-specialization, and one-sided development in the history of science
and philosophy. In biology or theoretical physics there are no clean-cut
distinctions between canonical rules of the game and heuristic rules of
strategy and tactics. We are inclined to believe, as popular books on
science tell us, that the 'permissible moves' are laid down for ever by
the laws of formal logic and the criteria for judging evidence; and that
strategy is determined only by the lie of the land, that is, the data of
observation. In fact, however, the rules turn out to be infiltrated with
implicit assumptions and 'self-evident axioms' which as often as not are
specious contraband; and the empirical strategies are often weighted by a
stubborn adherence to methods of interpretation and biassed techniques,
promoted to canonical status. Habit is heir to originality; without the
hierarchies of organized habits life would be chaos; creativity means
breaking up habits and joining the fragments into a new synthesis.

 

 

 

Matrix Categories

 

 

I have tried to outline the hierarchic organization of levels of
understanding, levels of consciousness, and levels of habit and
flexibility -- the last ranging from implicitly acquired codes, through
the master-switches of controlled association, to the explicitly learned
rules and pseudo-rules in the universes of discourse of science and
philosophy. To avoid giving undue dominance to the abstractive hierarchies
in the mental landscape, I must briefly mention some different types
of language matrices -- without aspiring at anything like a complete
catalogue.

 

 

Phonetic matrices
(of rhythm, meter, alliteration, assonance,
rhyme, and euphony) do not properly belong to symbolic thought, though
they interact with it not only in poetry and word-games but also in
ordinary discourse, often more persistently than we are aware of.

 

 

Chronological matrices
, naively regarded, seem to be linear
chains of events, but are of course nothing of the sort. They
are multi-dimensional structures in semantic space, governed by a
diversity of selective codes, whose criteria of relevance are often
quite indifferent to temporal order. This applies to personal memories,
which always unfold within specific frames of reference, but also to
written History: historians organize their material according to highly
idiosyncratic rules for sifting and interpreting evidence, and for
constructing causative theories.

 

 

Classificatory codes
in taxinomy, indexing systems and in certain
branches of mathematical logic are hierarchic par excellence but rigid;
they resemble stone pyramids in the mental landscape.

 

 

Dogmatic matrices
could be described as closed systems with
distorted feedback and impaired sub-skills of reasoning. They are ruled
by a fixed code derived from an act of faith, a circular argument, or
supposedly self-evident axioms. In other respects, however, they are
remarkably adaptable, and their dialectical strategies are of great
subtlety. Related to these are
frames of value
which determine
ethical or aesthetic judgements or attitudes, and
emotion-dominated
matrices
which need not be discussed as a separate category, since
emotion enters in various guises and intensities into all form of thought.

 

 

Lastly, 'style codes' represent a person's idiosyncrasies, mannerisms,
etc., which, in their ensemble, constitute his individuality. Gait,
gesture, voice, hand-writing are all governed by stable automatic
codes. If a person, deprived by accident of the use of his right hand,
learns to write with the left, his signature, before long, recovers its
true character. 'Even the suspicious bank clerk will cash his cheque
because the old form of signature returns,' wrote Penfield [3], who had
several such patients. 'The pattern of the signature and of the writing
is in the brain, not in the hand.'

 

 

This applies, to a considerable extent, even to the
style
of
writing. Hemingway or Proust can be identified -- and parodied -- after
reading a few lines -- as you identify the timbre of a drum or violin
after a few transients. Even the language of common mortals whose style
is undistinguished and seemingly indistinguishable, appears to have fixed
characteristic ratios -- e.g. between the number of adjectives to verbs.

 

 

The total matrix, which comprises all these frames of behaviour,
constitutes the personality structure. But even here, the code can
apparently be triggered on and off by some super-master-switch -- as
the spectacular cases of multiple personalities indicate. Once more the
hierarchy fades into a receding series.

 

 

 

NOTES

 

 

To
p. 634
. Cyberneticists have discussed at length
models which are supposed to be capable of this feat. But they have no
bearing on the question of awareness.

 

 

To
p. 637
. A summary of earlier work on controlled
association tests, and the controversies around it (e.g. complex theory
versus constellation theory) can be found e.g. in Woodworth (1939),
pp. 790-800.

 

 

 

 

 

 

XVII

 

 

ASSOCIATION

 

'Multiple Attunements'

 

 

Associationism is dead, but association remains one of the fundamental
facts of mental life. So far I have considered mental organization
chiefly in its 'vertical' aspect -- hierarchic structures formed by
abstractive processes in ascending series. But each verbal concept,
apart from being a member of a 'vertical' hierarchy, is also a member
of several connotative matrices, each of which could be represented
by an inclined plane. The concept's place in the vertical, abstractive
hierarchy provides the dictionary definition -- as far as that goes --
of its meaning. But the concept as a psychological reality, its aura of
connotations, and its individual significance to the person who actually
uses it, is determined by the multitude of matrices which intersect in
it. Each of them provides an associative context governed by a selective
code; and the more there are of these inclined planes in semantic space
the richer and more multi-dimensional the concept.

 

 

If concepts are to be regarded as atoms of thought, they are certainly
not the hard lumps of classical physics. In the first place, they are
unstable and subject to change -- to change both in definition and in
connotation. My concept of a 'gene' or a 'seductress', or of 'President
Eisenhower' is certainly not the same as it was ten years ago, though
the verbal label attached to each of these concepts has remained the
same. It is strange to reflect that a major part of our scientific and
philosophical vocabulary consists of old Greek bottles filled and refilled
with new wine; that "electron" once meant a piece of amber, and Homer's
"cosmos" a flat disc covered by a vault. It is even stranger that the
same Sanskrit root "matr" split, by mitosis, as it were, into "maya" --
the Oriental's web of illusions, and "metron", metre, the Occidental's
yardstick to measure the world.

 

 

A concept has as many dimensions in semantic space as there are
matrices of which it is a member.
Let me return for a moment to the
example of the parlour game mentioned before, 'towns starting with M'.
In playing that game, I write down on my list 'Madrid' -- which proves that
the concept Madrid is a member of the phonetic matrix governed by the
code 'initial M'. Since I am bored with the game, I permit my thoughts
to wander, and at once an image arises: the crowd at the Puerta del Sol
stampeding in the panic of an air bombardment -- and off we go along the
emotion-charged matrix of my memories of the Spanish Civil War. At this
moment Brenda's little girl -- who was watching the game, equally bored
-- asks, 'What is Madrid?'; and I oblige with the information: 'Madrid
is the capital of Spain and of the Province of Madrid, situated on the
left bank of the river Manzanares, which falls into the river Jarama' --
whereby I have produced a definition of sorts of the concept 'Madrid'. A
moment later I remember the Prado, with its Goyas, Velasquezes, and
El Grecos -- which are items in a mental catalogue indexed under the
code 'Painters', sub-code 'Painters, Spanish' (but also under 'Spain',
sub-code 'Spain, painters of'). These connotations presented themselves
more or less automatically, but now my repertory of associations is
nearly exhausted, and my mind a momentary blank. Add to the repertory
the printed and auditory-vocal images of the word, plus the location of
the town on a mental map, and you get about half a dozen matrices which
will be activated by, and which will activate, the concept 'Madrid'
without effort. The associative contexts of a concept that are firmly
established in a person's repertory of thought-habits, are less numerous
than we are inclined to believe -- as free association tests demonstrate.

 

 

If, on the other hand, somebody asks me to talk about the geological
foundations of Madrid, I shall make an embarrassed effort, and recall
that the town stands on an undulating plateau and, by some inarticulate
analogy, perhaps arrive at the conclusion that the soil consists chiefly
of sand and clay. But that was an
inference
arrived at by the usual
method of problem-solving, and not of a spontaneous association. My matrix
of geological knowledge is scant; its code consists of the vague rule 'all
that is relevant to the structure of the earth's crust'. This indicates
the direction in semantic space of the search for an answer; but since
the data of knowledge are lacking, there is little firm ground on which
to move about. 'Madrid' was not a member of my geological matrix; after
this embarrassing experience, it has been
recruited
to membership,
but its ties to the matrix remain weak and tentative.

 

 

We have seen that the concept Madrid can be activated by any of the
matrices to which it belongs (for instance 'Civil War'); and vice versa,
that any of these matrices can be activated by it. If we assign to each
matrix, metaphorically speaking, a specific 'wave-length' then the concept
may be represented as
an aggregate of several oscillation-circuits
,
each of which will receive and emit on the specific 'wave-length' of
its matrix. We may call this the 'multiple attunement' of the concept
to the various matrices of which it is a member.*
Now the aggregate of circuits, which is the concept, may
receive
on one wave-length and emit on another
. 'Madrid' was evoked by the
phonetic matrix 'initial M', and in its turn activated a different matrix,
'Civil War', which functions on a different wave-length. If the matrix of
the incoming signal is of a complex or abstract character, the aggregate
may tend to switch over to a circuit functioning on the wave-length
of an emotionally more appealing matrix. Thus a concept is a member of
several clubs, but it likes some clubs more than others. Its 'multiple
attunements' may be represented as a line-spectrum of frequencies with a
relatively stable energy-distribution. The frequencies of maximum energy
-- like the dominant partials in a sound-spectrum -- would represent
the concept's 'most-preferred' associative contexts. As the years go by,
new lines would be added to the spectrum, while others would fade away,
and the energy-distribution of associative preferences would change --
getting mellower perhaps, like an old Stradivarius, or croaking, like
an un-tuned piano. The effort to 'concentrate' on an abstract problem
is probably proportionate to the energy required to inhibit preferential
associative contexts of high energy-potential -- i.e. 'habit strength'.
The preceding paragraphs may have given an exaggerated impression of
the subjectivity of concepts -- rather on the lines of the Red Queen's
'a word means what I intend it to mean'. The connotations of concepts
referring to individuals or places are of course largely personal;
but on the other hand, there is experimental evidence to show that the
associative priorities and the connotative 'aura' of concepts of a general
character are surprisingly stable and standardized in individuals of the
same culture. 'Marbe's Law' demonstrated the existence of a logarithmic
relation between an individual's reaction-time in giving a certain
response to a stimulus-word in an association test, and the frequency of
the same response occurring in a group of people.** Osgood has invented
an ingenious method of measuring 'semantic differentials'. The subjects
were asked to assess the ratings of a concept -- e.g. POLITE -- on ten
different graded scales: e.g. 'angular-rounded', 'cold-hot', 'good-bad',
'wet-dry'. Two groups of twenty subjects were used, and the mean ratings
of each group were then plotted and compared. Surprisingly enough, the
two graphs were almost identical; even more surprising, the greatest
amount of disagreement (c. fifteen per cent) was found in the ratings
of politeness as 'good' or 'bad': one group thought that to be polite
deserved a 'goodness' rating of six points, the other of six and a half
points, on a seven-point scale. [1]
To recapitulate: a concept may be regarded as a relatively stable
aggregate or 'cluster' of receiving-transmitting circuits, with a kind
of nuclear core: the verbal label ('MADRID'). Additional circuits may
be recruited, others may fade with disuse, and the relative energy
potentials of the circuits may be altered by long-term processes or the
person's momentary mood; but the auditory-vocal (and visual) trace of the
word MADRID remains unaltered, and thus preserves the identity of the
concept through all these changes in time. We may further assume that
any incoming signal, regardless through which circuit it is received,
will activate the nuclear circuit -- the auditory-vocal trace. If all
goes well the response output will be emitted on the same wave-length
on which the input was received, and I shall happily go on playing
the 'towns with M' game. But since the cluster 'hangs together' it is
likely that some amount of excitation has nevertheless spread to other
circuits not concerned with the game -- and thus caused the fleeting,
fringe-conscious stirrings of my memories of the Civil War. This is a
minor, permissible kind of distraction; and perhaps even a necessary
one -- without such ripples the stream of thought would be linear,
colourless, all-too single-minded. But if one of the circuits with
a high energy-potential gets excited, the control centres on higher
levels of the hierarchy must prevent it from taking over if chaos
is not to result; i.e., the code of the 'distracting' matrix must be
blocked. During strenuous efforts to concentrate, one seems literally to
'feel' inside one's head the expenditure of energy needed to suppress
diversional thoughts which keep popping up like jacks-in-the-box. 'A
great part of our fatigue', Maxwell once remarked, 'often arises, not
from those mental efforts by which we obtain the mastery of the subject,
but from those which are spent in recalling our wandering thoughts' --
particularly, one may add, during a long and boring lecture; while the
reverse phenomenon is produced by the disinhibiting action of alcohol
and drugs. All this seems to indicate that our preferential matrices of
ideation are most of the time blocked by centres on higher levels --
which agrees well with the predominantly restraining function of the
hierarchic controls in perceptual and motor organization.
Types of Association
I have used the word Association loosely, as it is nowadays mostly used.
In Drever's
Dictionary of Psychology
, for instance, we find:

Association: used generally of the principle in accordance with
which ideas, feelings, and movements are connected in such a way as
to determine their succession in the mind or in the actions of an
individual, or of the process of establishing such connections.

Or take Humphrey (1951):

The term "association", or mental association, is a general name often
used in psychology to express the conditions under which mental events,
whether of experience or behaviour, arise. [2]

Hebb (1958) speaks at length about the association areas of the cortex,
but does not define association. Other authors, and textbooks, differ
widely in their definitions of the word, or prefer, wisely, not to define
it at all.
Hobbes was probably the first to draw a distinction between what came
later to be called 'free association' and 'controlled' association:

The train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of two sorts. The first
is unguided, without design, and inconstant . . . in which case the
thoughts are safe to wander, as in a dream. . . . The second is more
constant, as being regulated by some desire and design. [3]

However, free association is never entirely free: there are motivations,
conscious or sub-conscious, which give it direction. On the other hand,
association controlled by some rule of the game, such as 'towns with
M', is 'free' to the extent that the rule allows alternative choices
between permissible moves. The degrees of freedom of a matrix vary from
rigid automatism to the great adaptability of complex mental skills;
and the flow of associative thought will accordingly vary in character:
it may move along fixed canals, or follow, like a rivulet, the accidents
of the terrain and make detours round obstacles with an air of earnest
goal-directedness.
Since the attempts of the classic associationist school to reduce thinking
to association by contiguity and similarity (plus the 'secondary laws' of
facilitation) had to be abandoned, the principles 'supposedly underlying
association have been classified and re-classified over and again. Thus
Wells [4] once made a catalogue of eighteen types of association adapted
from Jung, such as: 'egocentric predicate' (example: lonesome -- never);
'evaluation' (rose -- beautiful); 'matter of fact predicate' (spinach --
green); 'subject-verb' (dog -- bite), and so forth, through 'object-verb',
'cause-effect', 'co-ordination', 'subordination', 'supraordination',
'contrast', 'coexistence', 'assonance', etc. Woodworth (1939) suggested
four classes: definition including synonyms and supraordinates; completion
and predication; co-ordinates and contrasts; valuations and personal
associations. He also suggested an independent classification cutting
across the one just mentioned, according to a scale from 'meaningfulness'
to 'superficiality'. [5] Most of the
experimental
work refers to
association tests where the stimulus is a single word and the response
is restricted to one other word -- a condition not exactly typical of
ordinary verbal discourse outside the laboratory.
The lesson which emerges from these elaborate and painstaking attempts
at classification is that the principles underlying associative thinking
are determined by the matrix in which the thinking takes place; and that
there are as many types of association as there are codes which control
verbal behaviour. In bilingual countries like Switzerland, the response to
a German stimulus-word will often be its French' equivalent; some people
are addicted to metaphor, others to punning; the chess phyer and the
draughts player's associations follow the rules of their respective games.
To sum up: associative thinking is the exercise of a habit. It may
be rigid or flexible, with a wide range of adaptability; yet it
remains a habit in so far as it observes certain invariant rules of
the game. Association, qua exercise of a skill, is thus distinguished
from
learning
, which is the acquisition of a new skill, and
from
bisociation
, which is the combination, re-shuffling and
re-structuring of skills. But these categories overlap -- as discussed
in the next chapter.
NOTES
To