Supreme Commander (65 page)

He had help. In late May Koenig worked out the diplomatic ban impasse. He allowed Allied authorities to examine his cables going to Algiers, then sent them in French code. The Allies allowed him to do this because he gave his word he would make no changes before encoding the messages. Incoming cables from Algiers were of course not at issue.
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On June 1 Churchill made his contribution to conciliation by inviting De Gaulle to come to London to be briefed on the operation.
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The Frenchman at first refused, but the other members of the Committee convinced him he had to go, and on June 4 he arrived in England. Immediately, he began to say
non
to every proposal SHAEF made. Churchill briefed him on OVERLORD and asked him to co-operate by broadcasting to the French people and to the Resistance the strong request that they follow Eisenhower’s orders. De Gaulle refused. He was, Churchill noted, “bristling.” De Gaulle said political and military matters went hand in hand and that he could do nothing until political recognition of some kind was accorded him. He asked for an absolutely free right to telegraph to Algiers in his own cipher, without anyone reading the messages beforehand. Churchill calmed him, then asked him to make a broadcast to the French people on the eve of the invasion.
De Gaulle agreed, or at least seemed to. The conversation turned to the American President. De Gaulle made no attempt to hide his bitterness, and finally Churchill shouted at him, “Each time we must choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Each time I must choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt.” De Gaulle growled that he had expected as much and the interview ended.
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Churchill had arranged to bring Eisenhower and De Gaulle together on June 3. Eisenhower would come to the advanced command post at Portsmouth, where last-minute preparations for the invasion were under way. The Prime Minister arrived first and had a few quiet minutes with the Supreme Commander. De Gaulle then appeared, and Eisenhower took him on a grand tour of the war room, pointing to the maps that covered the walls and explaining the forthcoming operation. De Gaulle lectured on how it should be done. Eisenhower nodded gravely and said he regretted that he did not have time to make the changes De Gaulle suggested. Churchill then withdrew and Eisenhower and De Gaulle went for a stroll up a shady cinder path “where there was enough elbow room for de Gaulle to wave his arms and talk. Ike did some too.”
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Eisenhower handed De Gaulle a copy of the speech he was going to make to the French people. He did so, according to De Gaulle, with some embarrassment, for in it the Supreme Commander urged Frenchmen to “carry out his orders,” told them that local administration would continue, and promised that once France was liberated “the French themselves would choose their representatives and their government.”

For De Gaulle this was all nonsense, dangerous nonsense. Eisenhower spoke of the French forces under his command, when in fact no agreement about the employment of French troops in OVERLORD had yet been signed. There was no mention at all of De Gaulle or the FCNL. Vichy administrators would stay in power. Worst of all, SHAEF, it seemed to De Gaulle, was obviously planning for a military occupation of France. De Gaulle told Eisenhower that the speech had to be changed. Eisenhower replied that it was too late—it had already been cleared with both governments and recorded. In that case, De Gaulle declared, he would not speak after Eisenhower, since that would give the impression that he approved of the SHAEF program. He had not asked to come to London but, since he was there, he would do what he could to save the sovereignty of France. If the Allies insisted on going ahead with their plans, there was nothing he could do to stop them, but he certainly was not going to help them.
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Another major issue that aroused De Gaulle was currency. SHAEF had printed occupation francs and wanted De Gaulle to issue a statement telling the French people he authorized their use and would guarantee them. De Gaulle refused. He pointed out with some intensity that France was being treated precisely like Italy and that he alone, as President of the Provisional Government, had the right to issue currency.
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It was, Eisenhower sadly noted, “a rather sorry mess.” He was most worried about the Resistance. SHAEF had lines to the Resistance through the British Special Operations Executive, and the Resistance was primed to carry out extensive railroad sabotaging which would help to deny the German strategic mobility. If the underground did not act, much would be lost. But, as Eisenhower reported, “all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these Resistance Groups desire to recognize is that of de Gaulle and his Committee.”
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Because of the nature of Eisenhower’s address and because of the currency issue, De Gaulle resisted all pressure and refused to make his own broadcast to the French people. A comic opera ensued with nearly every important American and Britisher in London arguing with De Gaulle. How would it look, they asked, if it became known that he was in London on the eve of the invasion and had refused to add his voice to those of the other heads of governments in exile? A series of cables to Washington charted the course of the discussion. “General de Gaulle will speak,” “General de Gaulle will not speak,” and “the General has changed his mind.”
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The evening of June 5 Smith telephoned Eisenhower—who had other things on his mind—to report that De Gaulle would not speak. Giving in to his impulses, Eisenhower said, “To hell with him and if he doesn’t come through, we’ll deal with someone else.”
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There was, however, no one else to deal with and the efforts to convince De Gaulle to make the broadcast continued.

But final victory was De Gaulle’s. He spoke on the day of the invasion, from his own text. “The orders given by the French government and by the leaders which it has recognized must be followed precisely,” he emphasized.
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Another French crisis had been, if not met and overcome, at least passed over.

Eisenhower had been unable to avoid the complexities of French politics. He had been forced into the heart of them because of his position. On two other major political issues he became involved because of his own actions. He felt strongly about the form that the military occupation of Germany would take and about the policy of unconditional surrender. He believed the President was making serious errors. Ignoring his own oft-repeated comments about being apolitical, he initiated discussion with Roosevelt on the subjects. This irritated the President and, since Eisenhower did not get his way, the Supreme Commander was left unhappy.

Eisenhower raised his first political objection while he was in Washington in January. He called on the President, who was sick in bed with influenza. They had a long conversation on the occupation of Germany. COSSAC had prepared a plan, to be implemented in case of a sudden German collapse, which set up three zones, with the Russians in the east, the British in the northwest, and the Americans in the southwest. The European Advisory Commission, which had just been formed and which included representatives of each of the Big Three, had accepted the basic idea. So had Roosevelt, although he wanted to switch zones with the British. Eisenhower, who had been briefed on these developments, told the President that the policy was a mistake. Germany, he declared, should not be divided into zones. Rather, the military government ought to be conducted by a coalition of the Allied forces, including the Russians.

In a memorandum to Smith on May 20 Eisenhower said he realized the point was academic if the United States intended to withdraw all troops from Europe shortly after the conclusion of hostilities. But, he added, his conversation with Roosevelt convinced him that the President was beginning to realize that the Americans would have to leave occupation troops in Germany for some time to come. This in turn was a logical outgrowth of Roosevelt’s over-all European policy and plans: with Britain exhausted, a vacuum in Germany, and France unlikely to recover, the Americans had to stay in Germany or perforce leave the Red Army as the sole power base in central Europe. But since it was not to be expected that Roosevelt could keep American boys in Germany
indefinitely, there had to be some way to compel the Red Army to pull back when the Americans came home. Having a single supreme commander who took his orders from all three governments would solve the problem. Eisenhower told Smith that when the time came to turn Germany over to civilian authorities it would be easier to get the Red Army out if there were such a commander, as there would be in the kind of coalition military government Eisenhower had proposed.

Eisenhower expected the Russians would take some drastic action in Europe, but he did not feel that they would become points of disagreement, for he thought they were justified. Thus, he told Smith, the Russians “will undoubtedly demand the utilization of German labor in order to restore their own devastated districts,” and predicted that the Soviets would keep a tight control on eastern Germany and the Balkans. Eisenhower did not believe these actions would put any strain on the alliance.

Years later, Eisenhower succumbed to the temptation to reconcile his World War II views with Cold War rhetoric, and the story he then told about his conference with Roosevelt differed significantly from what he had said to Smith in May 1944. When he wrote his memoirs Eisenhower recalled that he had told Roosevelt that a joint occupation was necessary to control the Soviets. If Germany were divided into zones, he feared administration would be difficult. Roosevelt, Eisenhower remembered, made light of his fear of the Russians, and when Eisenhower pressed the point the President grew impatient. Roosevelt said he could deal with the Russians, which conveniently put all the blame on the dead President. Eisenhower also later declared that he had opposed a “hard” policy toward postwar Germany, when in fact his record was at least ambivalent.
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In any case the President had set forth his policy and the general continued to question its wisdom. In February Eisenhower proposed to Marshall that the United States refuse to take specific responsibility for any area. Instead, he asked, “Why should we not place ourselves on record as saying we will retain responsibility … only so long as the Allied principle of unity of Command is observed …?” Eisenhower thought this “simple formula” would help keep the United States out of “unnecessary difficulties and would still give our President a major voice in the establishing of policy.” This was important, Eisenhower added, because the United States would be making the largest contribution to the rebuilding of Europe, and thus ought to have a say everywhere.
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Marshall sent the suggestion over to Roosevelt, who passed word back to Eisenhower to “sit tight.”
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Eisenhower did, but he continued to discuss the idea. In mid-May Major General LeRoy Lutes, who was on an inspection tour for Somervell, stopped in at Widewing to talk with Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander went on at length about the future organization of Europe, “stating that in his opinion an Allied General Headquarters, or Mission, should be set up to handle Europe until such time as the United States Army withdrew.” Eisenhower thought that if this were not done the Russians would play the British against the United States and the United States against the British. An Allied GHQ could settle such matters and could allocate resources to the best interests of all. Lutes liked the idea. His only fear was that since in his opinion the British already dominated SHAEF they might dominate an Allied GHQ.
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During the next two weeks, possibly as a result of conversations with traveling Americans, Eisenhower dropped the idea of Big Three cooperation throughout Germany. He still wanted to avoid an Anglo-American division into zones. On June 27 he wrote Marshall, “I have reason to believe that the President is still open-minded on the question which has given us all considerable thought, namely—a combined or separate British and American zones of occupation in Germany.” His talks with Roosevelt convinced him that the President contemplated keeping a small American force on the Continent for a considerable period after the armistice, but he felt that Roosevelt had not distinguished in his own mind whether there should be a complete amalgamation of British and American units, or a complete segregation of them. Eisenhower favored keeping SHAEF in existence and treating West Germany as a common zone. One advantage was that the CCS would remain in existence as long as the war with Japan continued, and the Chiefs would look upon the Anglo-American forces remaining in Europe as a reservoir from which they could draw strength to pursue the Pacific war. But CCS orders were valid only when processed through an Allied commander in chief; thus it would be “convenient and desirable” to keep SHAEF.

What Eisenhower was most concerned about was “abandonment of the Allied principle.” As always, his commitment to Anglo-American solidarity was complete. He thought it dangerous to set up special areas with special interests, since it might lead to a split. “Instead of presenting a solid front that has characterized all our operation … every problem
arising would first have to be settled on a British versus American basis.…”
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Unfortunately for Eisenhower’s position, the President was not still open-minded on the subject of zones. While Eisenhower’s letter was en route, Roosevelt told Marshall to tell Eisenhower to proceed in his occupation planning on the assumption that the Americans would have their own zone. Eisenhower therefore let the subject rest, although in August he would raise it again.
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The second political question in which Eisenhower involved himself was the unconditional surrender policy. Eisenhower and Smith had privately agreed that it was an error, but no one had asked their opinions and they had not gone out of their way to make them known. In April, however, when Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius was in London, the subject did come up. Stettinius told Eisenhower the President was far from well and “becoming increasingly difficult to deal with because he changes his mind so often.”
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After more discussion, both Smith and Eisenhower said there should be some clarification of the meaning of unconditional surrender “by announcing the principles on which the treatment of a defeated Germany would be based.” Eisenhower said this was highly desirable “in view of the accumulated evidence that German propaganda is interpreting the words of ‘Unconditional Surrender’ to strengthen the morale of the German Army and people.”